It's time to strengthen Nato by asking more of our allies." The emphasis in the sentence is mine but, as Barack Obama travels to Europe, the implication of his remark will not have been lost on his eager hosts.
The Democratic candidate for the White House greatly cheers America's friends when he promises to repair old alliances. The enthusiasm wanes somewhat when it is suggested they have more to contribute.
Recently, I wrote of the warm reception Obama can expect on the old continent. This week I want to look at how the good intentions (on both sides) measure up against tougher realities.
There is little Europe can quarrel with in the broad thrust of the national security strategy set out by Obama in a speech in Washington last week.
Most Europeans, if not governments, opposed the Iraq war and will applaud a commitment to careful US withdrawal.
The policy of engagement with adversaries (Iran) is one Europeans old and new have long urged on President George W. Bush. Energy security and climate change are European priorities.
The war in Afghanistan, albeit lacking clear strategic purpose, has international legitimacy. Obama was also nice about the United Nations and spoke intelligently of military might as only one dimension of US power.
Being Europeans, Obama's hosts have caveats. Talk to Iran, yes, they will say, but do not rush it. The failure of an ill-prepared diplomatic damarche, they fret, could well hasten military strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities.
Get out of Iraq, certainly, but not in a fashion that unleashes a Shiite-Sunni civil war. Put more troops into Afghanistan - and, yes, bolster civilian aid to Pakistan - but do not think only in terms of a military victory over the Taliban.
These are all things that can be sorted out if a new US administration and the Europeans get the framework of their relationship right. Goodwill on both sides will be important.
Trust, and its absence, are the most underestimated ingredients of geopolitics. But reinjecting life into the partnership will require understanding of its purpose and worth as well as honourable intent.
Even as Obama pledges his fealty, some of his advisers will be whispering that the alliance has run its course: no need for an acrimonious divorce, but the US and Europe are destined to drift towards separation.
Incapable
The image of Europe as an ageing, sclerotic continent of pacifists, locked in demographic decline and dangerously incapable of integrating its Muslim minorities, reaches well beyond Bush's administration.
It is true also that a relationship that used to be one of mutual necessity is now one of choice. Europe is no longer the centre of US strategic interest.
The Middle East and Asia, above all a rising China, have assumed that place. Incidentally, the end of the Cold War also greatly reduced European dependence on the US.
Infuriating though Europe often seems to a nation that prefers action to talk, Obama should not under-estimate the utility of the alliance.
Putting aside trade, investment and financial links - worth a lot to both sides - Europe offers a legitimacy that is essential to the effective exercise of US power. If Obama wants to build multilateral support for US leadership, London, Berlin, Paris and Brussels are the places to start.
The alliance also comes pretty cheap. What Europeans most crave is an audience. My American friends often remind me that Europe still shelters under a US security umbrella.
That is true, and Europeans should be more attentive to the debt. It is fair to say, though, that the US presence also serves Washington's interests. Would the US consider its security enhanced if, say, Germany were to grow much closer to Moscow?
To the intense irritation of their US counterparts, Europeans like talking, and then talking some more. Having spentmuch of the first half of the 20th century killing each other, they decided that interminable negotiation was a better option.
You can see why this offends the instincts of can-do Americans. Yet Obama would presumably agree that everyone would be better off had there been more talking at the UN before the Iraq war.
So what can Obama reasonably ask of Europe? First, he could say quite bluntly that he is ready to talk, and listen, if Europe is prepared to act. Europeans want to change the world by peaceful example.
No bad thing. But they are too slow to acknowledge that normative, as well as military, power has limits. Europeans live in a postmodern society, but the world beyond is a much rougher, less reasonable place.
One example: the best way to ensure that talks with Iran have some chance of success is for Europe to be ready to impose much tougher sanctions if Tehran negotiates in bad faith.
The second reasonable expectation is that Europeans bear more of the burden of the West's security. If governments are not ready to increase defence budgets, they might at least stop cutting them and do more to modernise and integrate their militaries. And, yes, they should agree to send more troops to Afghanistan.
Obama has chosen Berlin (echoes of JFK) for the big speech of his tour. He had hoped to set up at the Brandenburg Gate (recalling Ronald Reagan).
But after a political fuss in Angela Merkel's coalition, a more likely venue now seems to be Tempelhof airport. That carries its own symbolism: the airport served as the lifeline for German democracy during the Soviet blockade of Berlin.
Germany is the right place to call for a renewal of the alliance. A sizeable segment of that country's political opinion seems to be caught up in a strange "Ostalgia" - rather than allying itself with an overbearing US, Germany should cuddle up to the undemanding softies in the Kremlin. Such is the power of self-delusion.
Obama this week invoked the memory of George Marshall to frame his ambitions for the renewal of the global order. Therein lies the most important message for Europeans and Americans alike.
The west has prospered because of its commitment to an international system grounded in rules as well as military might.
A final thought: Obama could make a small, and costless, concession to European sensibilities by telling his aides not to talk about "tough love".
