Considering the level of political violence in Pakistan, the need of the hour is a healing touch. If eight years of direct military rule or military dominance with a fragile civilian facade have polarised the society as never before, conventional wisdom would point to a fair and free election as the way out. Restoration of authentic representative institutions could possibly bring back at least some of the contentious issues within the ambit of democratic mediation and accommodation. It may also make the debate in the country about the imperative of national reconciliation more meaningful.
This is exactly where dark misgivings persist and vitiate the atmosphere. A credible election demands a level playing field. Recent events in Pakistan are tantamount to a denial of this demand. National reconciliation warrants an inclusive approach to various segments of the country's divided polity. If democracy is an antidote to the poison of centrifugal tensions amongst the federating provinces as well as to the deadlier venom of extremism, voices of dissent must be carefully listened to and not silenced by force.
Like most other politicians in Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif has had a chequered career. His two stints as prime minister ended in a blaze of allegations repeated endlessly over the years. As in the case of Benazir Bhutto, this hostile propaganda blitz made a negative impact here and there but a vast majority of Pakistanis concluded that allegations were not credible and that the people of Pakistan should make the final judgment about them in a fair election.
After seven years of forced absence from Pakistan's political scene, Sharif made an attempt to return to it on September 10 and got, in the words of a respectable British journalist, who had travelled with him from London, hustled by armed commandos on to an aircraft that whisked him away to Saudi Arabia.
What awaits Benazir Bhutto when she travels to Pakistan to claim her undisputed leadership of Pakistan Peoples Party is the focus of national attention now. Arguably, Sharif came to intensify the confrontation between the political class and General Pervez Musharraf while Bhutto would arrive to end it. This should make for a different outcome. But does the basis for bridging that dangerous gap exist?
The answer depends to an extent on how one interprets the events of September 10. Did the shabby treatment meted out to Sharif substantiate the claim that his deportation would facilitate an understanding with Bhutto and set the stage for a tranquil, fair and free election? Conversely, was it a demonstration of absolute power regained after its temporary loss in the Chief Justice affair? In the latter case, it could be seen as a warning to Bhutto that she should not keep raising the price of her cooperation. Far too many of her followers fear today that what would be offered to her now would be the shadow and not the substance of political power. Many of them think that the threat posed by Sharif to Musharraf would have added to her bargaining power and that his forcible ouster from the scene has actually diminished it.
The deportation of Sharif has, indeed, raised some fundamental issues. The concept of exile is totally alien to Pakistan's Constitution. He had journeyed to Islamabad after an unambiguous verdict by the Supreme Court that he was free to return. In deporting Sharif, the regime may have deliberately resumed its battle with the higher judiciary which may soon be called upon to adjudicate challenges to Musharraf's right to another term, particularly while retaining the all powerful office of army's chief of staff.
Secondly, the triumphal comments by some members of the government that the military, the bureaucracy and friendly foreign powers supported the decision to exile Nawaz Sharif suggest that the regime may not offer Bhutto much accommodation on her basic demands. She has insisted that arbitrary powers such as the constitutional provision enabling Musharraf to dismiss elected governments and assemblies be done away with. The hope that such powers will at least be diluted by special amendments is fading away.
Third, there is a demoralising perception in the country that the orders of the Supreme Court of Pakistan were defied with active encouragement from some foreign powers that want the future government in Islamabad to be no more than an instrument of American military strategy in the region.
A report in the New York Times almost confirmed this perception. At least in the short term analysis, this future government will have to contend with a sharper anti-American mood in the country. Worse still, the great veneration in which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its royal family has been held in Pakistan for six decades faces unprecedented scepticism. Unquestioned faith in this vital strategic relationship rooted alike in religion and realpolitik is a great national asset for Pakistan ; it should not come under strain.
These and other factors will figure in the legal and political battles in the weeks ahead. Efforts to turn the Pakistan Peoples Party into a junior coalition partner of the army and the Muslim League faction popularly known as the king's party will not provide a national solution particularly if this coalition also locks out sub-regional and sub-national parties that have made a common cause with Sharif.
Bhutto can probably still lead her party to become the largest party in the National assembly but how far she can win back the confidence of the embittered provinces of Balochistan and the North West Frontier Province is open to question. There is also a strong under-current of resentment in parts of the Punjab that are Sharif's real power base against the rough manner in which the homecoming of their leader was frustrated. The tactical victory won by the government on September 10 may not necessarily represent a strategic gain.
Tanvir Ahmad Khan is a former foreign secretary and ambassador of Pakistan.
