|
A Defence Intelligence Agency official warned the CIA about the questionable reliability of an Iraqi defector who was the chief source of allegations that Saddam Hussain had mobile facilities for making biological weapons, but his information was included in the official pre-war intelligence estimate anyway, according to the report released last week by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
The defector, who was initially debriefed by the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) in 2000, was described in early US intelligence reports as a project engineer involved in designing and helping construct biological facilities in Iraq. Before the war, the Bush administration cited the allegation that Iraq possessed the mobile weapons facilities as a vivid reflection of the threat posed by Saddam. No evidence that the labs existed has been found since the invasion.
The Iraqi defector was listed as a "credible source" for the information on Iraq's bioweapons fleet in the CIA's October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, even though only one US intelligence analyst had ever interviewed him.
That interview took place in May 2000, when a DIA employee met with the man – later given the code name "Curve Ball" – to arrange for his helping the United States, according to the Senate report.
At that morning meeting, the defector was "having a terrible hangover", which raised questions about his reliability, according to the Senate report, which detailed deep flaws and exaggerations in the CIA's prewar intelligence reporting on Iraq.
In late 2002, the report said, the DIA official pressed a Western European intelligence agency – identified by officials as the German BND – for direct access again to the defector, but was told by his European counterparts that they now had misgivings about him. The DIA official was told that an interview "was not possible" because the Germans "were having major handling issues with him and were attempting to determine if, in fact, Curve Ball was who he said he was."
German officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said recently that they are still reviewing the defector's credentials. The DIA employee conveyed his scepticism of the defector's information and the German government's misgivings before the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, the Senate report said.
But his assessment did not seem to have much impact. A Defence HUMINT (human intelligence) Service officer who was responsible for collecting and reporting information from the Germans on the defector's statements, "did not recall" a separate evaluation by DIA analysts that said Curve Ball's reports suffered from inconsistencies, the Senate report said.
US intelligence officials finally interviewed the defector in recent months and "are continuing to question his reliability, although he has been convincing that he did have access to different levels" of Iraq's biological weapons programme, a senior administration official.
© Los Angeles Times-Washington Post News Service
|
